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“An Unqualified Human Good”? On Rule
of Law, Globalization, and Imperialism
Mark Brown
Forty years ago, E. P. Thompson praised the English rule of law forged during the
bloody and fractious eighteenth century, calling it not only “an unqualified human
good,” but also a “cultural achievement of universal significance.” This article examines
colonial rule-of-law development as another example of law and state building. Both
have relevance for contemporary rule-of-law programming in the Global South where
Thompson’s “cultural achievement” has resisted fabrication by legal technicians. The
problems faced today are not new, for colonial rulers also engaged with complex
indigenous norms and forms and sought to balance universal principles with political
control imperatives. Contra arguments about colonial “lawfare,” colonial rule of law
often frustrated authoritarian tendencies while developing new forms of legal subjectivity
and avenues for redress of grievances. Using data from the Indian province of Punjab,
the article illustrates how historical case studies might aid contemporary rule-of-law
programming in the Global South.
INTRODUCTION
It is forty years since E. P. Thompson penned a brief, twelve-page coda to
Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (1975), his magisterial study of
eighteenth-century English law and punishment. Titled simply “The Rule of Law,”
Thompson attempted in this endpiece to stand back from the immense detail of his
main study and to reflect more broadly on the importance of the system of English
law that emerged from the eighteenth century. By the time Albert Venn Dicey
wrote his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, he could claim that
this system of legality had become rooted within the English psyche. “An English-
man naturally imagines that the rule of law . . . is a trait common to all civilised
societies,” Dicey commented, “But this supposition is erroneous” ([1885] 1889,
182). Although many might argue about the quality of that law, and that after all
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was one of Thompson’s main observations, there seems little doubt that the vision
and legal structures that developed in England through the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries became a model for what rule of law was later imagined to be and
to achieve.
The purposes of this article are fourfold. First, it aims to use the fortieth
anniversary of Thompson’s (1975) radical reappraisal of one of English law’s
bloodiest moments to pose some questions about the possibilities of law as a vehi-
cle for social transformation in developing, fragile, and conflict-affected states.
Many of us likely remember Whigs and Hunters primarily as a study of punish-
ment: the Black Act’s notorious extension of capital sentences to eventually
around 200 often minor offenses. Thompson’s work began as an essay for the col-
lection Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England, edited
by Douglas Hay and colleagues (1975), but soon outgrew the essay form. Yet
together with Hay’s contribution to that collection, “Property, Authority and the
Criminal Law,” Whigs and Hunters was also, and probably more importantly, a
study of the development of law itself. Perhaps it was in recognition of this wider
significance that Thompson concluded his forensic examination of the bloody
travesty of justice the Black Act represented not with a final denunciation, but
with a plea to concentrate instead on its larger meaning and repercussions. In
penning his coda “The Rule of Law,” Thompson thus put aside the blood and
injustice of the Black Act. He concentrated instead on the questions of how an
alien and formal law came to replace customary norms, even when the outcomes
of this new justice so seldom favored those upon whom it was imposed, and how
ultimately this law also captured and tamed those in whose vested interests it
had been constructed. Thompson’s eighteenth-century case study is liable to
make his question seem arcane, but in fact it has enormous contemporary
relevance.
Describing that relevance is a second purpose of this article. The last two or
three decades have seen a resurgence of interest at an international level in the
possibilities of spreading safety and security through enhanced efforts to promote
the rule of law. A global industry has emerged, focused on building legal, policing,
and penal capacity in developing, fragile, and conflict-affected states. Those con-
cerned primarily with questions of domestic justice might thus be wholly unpre-
pared for the scale of the rule-of-law industry and the vast sums expended on it. In
2012, for example, the latest year for which figures are available, OECD overseas
development assistance on legal and judicial development alone totaled USD 3.27
billion. Another USD 1.32 billion was spent on the related goals of securing human
rights and women’s rights, for which much rule-of-law work aims to establish
respect. A further USD 2.93 billion was spent on the wider conflict, peace, and
security environment (OECD 2014). Atop this, there are rule-of-law promotion
efforts by other multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the World
Bank. In 2008, The Economist magazine concluded that “almost half the [World]
bank’s total lending of $24 billion in 2006 had some rule-of-law component” (Econ-
omist 2008). In 2014, UN rule-of-law programming extended to 150 nations and in
almost half of those, three or more separate UN agencies were engaged in rule-of-
law support activities (UN 2015).
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Despite all this, it is now widely accepted that the tsunami of spending, effort,
and goodwill has brought little positive result. Martin Krygier (2017, 133–34) suc-
cinctly sums up the situation, noting that:
Rule of law programs are implemented at vast expense in countries from
Afghanistan to Zambia. Billions of dollars are spent; thousands of intelli-
gent, ambitious, dedicated people have been involved. But the results
have not been especially happy.
Why so? One reason is that existing forms of traditional justice and customary law
continue to attract support and local use, while modern rule-of-law institutions and
processes either are co-opted by powerful elites or regarded by locals as unfit for
purpose. The problem, then, is not altogether different from that considered by
Thompson: How can a new system of law, bringing with it new notions of rights,
obligations, and norms, be established in an environment where inhabitants may
feel they already have perfectly good institutions of their own?
The two situations invite comparison, and indeed an attempt at such follows a
little later, but it is a third aim of this article to notice first a curious lacuna in con-
temporary rule-of-law literature and practice guides and to offer a suggestion to its
solution. The broader context of this lacuna is a not unreasonable focus within the
rule-of-law community on lesson learning and the dissemination of effective prac-
tice insights. Part of the problem, however, is that unlike economists, for example,
who have been able to reach back to the great crash of 1929 and further still in
their efforts to explain why no one adequately foresaw the recent global financial
crisis, rule-of-law scholars and practitioners alike hold a highly truncated view of
their own discipline and its history. For the most part, rule-of-law programming is
something imagined to have developed solely in the wake of World War II, and
not truly in earnest until at least the late 1980s or early 1990s (O’Connor 2015).
The putative lessons to be learned are therefore very short-term ones, generally cast
in terms of what people in other spheres would understand simply as program evalu-
ation results. Intimations are made that change—true, deep change—may take a
long time. In 2011, for example, the World Bank mooted the idea of forty years,
possibly, but no one really knows. Quite absent from this discussion is the long his-
tory of the introduction of laws in colonial and imperial contexts (cf. Klingner and
Jones 2004; Pimentel 2010).
Yet in a variety of places, colonial administrators introduced English-styled
rule of law as they sought to reshape often highly plural and localized legal cultures.
The approaches and results were uneven across the British Empire, but in many
cases they did a good enough job that courts complained of being oversubscribed
with local litigants attracted by the predictability of procedural justice. Many of
those same systems remain in place today. There is thus a much longer history to
rule-of-law reform than many contemporary scholars would allow. What is more,
colonial and postcolonial scholars alike have critiqued these developments, with
many engaging directly with the claims and insights of Thompson with respect to
the uptake of new law in old places and the restraining character of procedural law.
Thus it is that on the fortieth anniversary of E. P. Thompson’s study, we have
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something of a neat circle before us: an insightful account of the development of a
form of law in England that went on to become an international benchmark and
aspirational norm; a contemporary rule-of-law industry desperately in search of
some better understanding of how to bring rule of law to distant parts; and an until
now largely unexamined corpus of historical material and contemporary postcolo-
nial critique that may bridge the gap between the two.
Referencing this historical bridging, the final purpose of the article is to
respond to calls increasingly made across the spheres of development, economics,
and law for planners, policy makers, and thinkers to become more historically
aware. Partly this stems from the enduring influence of the work of Charles Tilly
(1985) whose bold claims on the virtues of violence in European state-making con-
tinue to stimulate debate on development under conditions of conflict and rapid
globalization (Meagher 2012). But there is also a broader movement afoot to bring
the more long-term, nuanced, contextualized, process-sensitive, and contingent
insights generated from historical analysis to an area of endeavor characterized by
blunt, monocausal, and, in particular, short-term visions of change. Thus, Michael
Woolcock, Simon Szreter, and Vijayendra Rao (2011, 75) argue that to the extent
that history is present at all in development programming, “the ‘history’ which pol-
icy makers use is likely to be na€ıve, simplistic and implicit, often derived from
unconscious assumptions or vague memories.” As we move forward in this article
toward a reconsideration of colonial engagements with law, we quite clearly move
into one of the prime contexts in which history has been avoided precisely on the
basis of such factors. But as Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao go on to observe, ignorance
is costly:
The (ab)use of history in this form not only represents a problem of com-
mission but also of omission, in that it both invokes a defective and dis-
torted rendering of history but also denies the policy process the vast
reservoir of imaginative resources available from more formal historical
research. (Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao 2011, 75)
Mark Massoud’s (2013) Law’s Fragile State, a study of law and politics in Sudan and
the subject of a recent special issue of this journal, is one example of the deep his-
torical research Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao would seem to value, as too is Nick
Cheesman’s (2015) Opposing the Rule of Law: How Myanmar’s Courts Make Law and
Order. This article aims to extend this deepening interest in rule of law’s historical
contexts and contemporary forms by contemplating colonial rule of law not simply
as antecedent to the contemporary, but also as a source of data and insight with sig-
nificant implications for today’s programming dilemmas.
Yet precisely what contribution could studying English and colonial legal his-
tory make to understanding or solving these contemporary rule-of-law dilemmas?
What, in other words, is the argument here for attending to colonial law? There are
three intersecting legs to it. The first is that the kernel of Thompson’s argument in
Whigs and Hunters—that despite the illiberal forms it might sometimes take, law
ultimately works to constrain arbitrary power, to protect those subject to it, and to
draw those new subjects toward an ideal of universal procedural justice and its
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forums—is borne out by studies of law across a variety of colonial contexts and
over a long period. Thus, Thompson’s single-case conclusions have now been widely
reaffirmed. This is particularly important to understanding the failure of contempo-
rary efforts to inject rule of law successfully into development and the transition of
fragile and postconflict societies. For it suggests that in sites of imperial contact we
may, if we care to look, find detailed historical records of success and failure in
tasks not wholly dissimilar to those currently being undertaken in countries as vari-
ous as Afghanistan and South Sudan, and for which it is currently thought there
are not good data to guide practice.
As we move back and forward in time and across literatures, however, certain
disjunctions in the conceptual landscape inevitably appear. One of the most signifi-
cant may be concern over the theoretical appropriateness or material relevance of a
distinction that is drawn throughout this article between formal and informal or
customary law. Within the colonial legal history literature, scholars have come
increasingly to soften and downplay notions of a strict formal versus customary law
divide, being inclined instead to emphasize both the instability of custom as law
and the deep and mutually constitutive relationship between so-called custom and
legal politics (Mallampalli 2010). This is not to say the distinction is entirely facile,
however. Respected scholars of law and state making have agreed on the ultimate
ascendency of state-based law in colonial societies. Lauren Benton (2002, 260), for
example, writes that “by the end of the nineteenth century the subordinate status
of nonstate law to state law no longer required a formal ideological defense.” This
chimes with contemporary rule-of-law thinking that tends to reify the importance
of the two legal spheres while also programming toward the ultimate primacy of for-
mal law. A sense of how the formal and informal are currently thought to relate is
given in the World Bank’s World Development Report, this year dedicated to the
theme “Governance and the Law.” There, “transitions to the rule of law” are char-
acterized in terms of the “shift from a customary or pluralistic system to a codified
modern one” (2017, 96). Moreover, and in support of this strand of the article’s
argument, the Report concludes that, ultimately:
[R]elatively little is known about the historical dynamics of that transi-
tion, and thus too little by way of theory is available to guide contempo-
rary developing countries as they seek to implement the rule of law.
(World Bank 2017, 97)
A second intersecting element of this article’s argument concerns the study of
colonial law per se. It is a critical point and it will bear a slightly extended elabora-
tion. It may be prefaced by noting that the idea that hundreds of years of colonial
experience might hold some lessons of contemporary relevance has, with limited
exceptions (Klingner and Jones 2004), been either studiously ignored or dissembled
within the rule-of-law practice literature. David Pimentel, a former Head of Rule of
Law for South Sudan under the UN Mission in Sudan, speaks of “the stigma of
imperialism” haunting contemporary law-bringing efforts and warns that “[r]ule of
law reformers must learn the lessons of colonialism, lest they perpetrate a new
imperialism” (2010, 1). Colonial history, clearly, is a topic of almost excruciating
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complexity and potential moral turpitude for rule-of-law programmers. Understand-
ably so perhaps, since they form a cadre of international actors who wish to act
imperially—that is, to intervene in a foreign country with ulterior motive, whether
that be mission civilisatrice or rebalancing gender rights—yet cannot speak its name.
In a footnote, Pimentel observes that “[u]nfortunately, much of the modern rule of
law literature seems to treat issues of colonialism as irrelevant ancient history, i.e.,
it ignores them. Yet in that history lie important lessons for rule of law efforts
today.” Pimentel thus describes a rule-of-law industry fearful of “cultural imperi-
alism” (2010, 1). Yet as that industry recoils in fear, its only vaguely apprehended
images of colonial encounters appear to it in quite Orientalized form. Indeed, one is
minded of Derek Gregory’s (2004, 7) description of those who would “reduce every-
thing to the marionette moves of a monolithic colonialism.”
None of this, of course, is to suggest that colonialism was or is a human good.
The shelves of most libraries are lined with accounts of why it was not and that lit-
any is so well rehearsed as to not bear repeating here. So the purpose of this article is
not to resurrect or reclaim imperialism for a new day. But if we may reprise E. P.
Thompson’s approach to the Black Act, it is possible to say this, which is the second
leg of the argument: that to agree that colonialism was not a universal good is not at
all the same thing as to say there is nothing to be learned from it, or indeed that it
left no positive legacies. In many postcolonial states, for example, the colonial-origin
Supreme Court stands today as a powerful bulwark against the exercise of arbitrary
power, be that exercised by generals, politicians, bureaucracies, or elites. Pakistan and
India both leap to mind in this respect, but South Africa is also an example. In each
of these places this colonially derived institution is the most trusted in the land:
more so than the army, more so than the politicians or the police. We can make
such observations without at all affecting our broader view of colonialism as a politi-
cal, economic, or moral form of oppression. So the purpose of studying colonial law is
not to dust off colonialism, it is rather to place the experience of colonial rule along-
side that of Hanoverian England as described in E. P. Thompson’s Whigs and Hunters
and to ask: Is there nothing at all to be learned from these pasts?
The third and final leg of this article’s argument is that understanding colonial
legal history matters because the problems with which colonial governments wres-
tled were not radically different to those confronting rule-of-law planners in devel-
oping, fragile, and postconflict states today. This leg of the argument is developed
further toward the end of the article, but in order to give a sense of its contours a
few features are worth picking out here. We may start by noting that colonial law
regularly wrestled with what are today perceived as common problems of legal
reform: how to reconcile reform agendas with governments’ tendencies toward
authoritarian rule; how to position the state as the ultimate source of legal author-
ity, while still recognizing, ordering, and having oversight of authority distributed
through plural legal orders; how to manage and regulate the impact of national and
global economic forces on previously isolated communities; how to secure rights in
property and other justiciable entitlements without disturbing social structures or
transferring wealth to small elites; and how to balance notions of right and obliga-
tion drawn from universal norms with the demands on the one hand of political
order and on the other of tradition and custom.
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Better understanding of the consonance of colonial law’s core questions with
those of contemporary reform work will be found not only in the colonial contexts
themselves, but also in the literatures of colonial legal history, primary and second-
ary. Thus, understanding how colonial regimes handled matters such as, for exam-
ple, forum shopping, or as Lauren Benton (2001; Benton and Ross 2013) has
termed it, jurisdictional politics, or how varieties of liberal state-subject relations
reflect different challenges posed to the developmental state, will be better appreci-
ated by attention to the literatures of colonialism and colonial legal history.
All of this is by way of preface, however. We should move now to examine his-
tory’s lessons for global rule-of-law programming by first revisiting E. P. Thompson’s
work in Whigs and Hunters. In the sights of his historical analysis was the emergence
of a system of English law and a new social order from the bonfire of the eighteenth
century’s bloody code, exemplified most acutely in the Black Act of 1723.
WHIGS AND HUNTERS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The opening passage of E. P. Thompson’s Whigs and Hunters gave notice of
three intersecting themes with which his study would be centrally concerned: the
emergence of an increasingly centralized, autonomous, and in many ways modern
state in Britain; the importance of property in reshaping state-society relations; and
the recruitment of law by the intermediate, propertied, but nevertheless vulnerable
social class known as Whigs, as a tool critical to shoring up their interests against
threats from both above and below. Thus he began:
The British state, all eighteenth century legislators agreed, existed to pre-
serve the property and, incidentally, the lives and liberties of the proper-
tied. But there are more ways than one of defending property; and
property was not, in 1700, trenched around on every side by capital stat-
utes. It was still not a matter of course that the legislature should, in every
session, attach the penalty of death to new descriptions of offence.
(Thompson 1975, 21)
In the chapters that followed, Thompson examined the importance and application
of one such legislative tool, 9 George I c.22, the Waltham Black Act, enacted over
the four weeks of May 1723. The Black Act, as it came to be known, was not so
named for its profligate application of the sentence of death. Rather, it derives from
the Act’s initial purpose to outlaw and make capital the bearing of arms and black-
ing of faces by alleged miscreants in the area of Waltham Forest whose ultimate
purpose, it was held, was the stealing of deer. New offenses were soon added,
including collecting firewood, taking turf, grazing animals, lifting fish, catching rab-
bits, burning haystacks, sending threatening letters, and so on. Although the threat
posed by the Waltham Blacks was held to be exceptional, in fact the focus of the
Act on forest crimes reflected a long-running but increasingly acute contest
between ancient and modern views of property and right.
Central to the Black Act and its application, therefore, were changing concep-
tions of use and ownership. On one side were forest dwellers and the property-less
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workers of the land who could cite rights in use to the commons going back deep
in time. On the other were aristocratic and wealthy landowners who increasingly
pressed their claim to ownership and sole use (or, importantly also, nonuse) of land
through its enclosure and the policing of its boundaries and contents. What laws or
rules should regulate these contests was also unclear due to confused and overlap-
ping jurisdiction between (royal) forest law and (parliamentary) statute law. Indeed,
sometimes the tussle was a three-way affair, pitting royal prerogative against local
landownership and below that the commoners whose rights in use were critical to
livelihoods. Thompson describes one such conflict in Windsor Great Park between
1717 and 1723, noting: “It was one of those tripartite conflicts . . . in which each
party held documents and could cite precedents, but which in practice was decided
by force and stealth” (49).
After 1723, that force by which wealthy landowners could press their claims to
ownership, encroach upon commons, redefine wastes, erect fences, and more gener-
ally break down longstanding patterns of social organization was bolstered by the
Black Act. In a scathing assessment of the politics of Hanoverian England, Thomp-
son describes that Act as “an original charter of death for eighteenth-century legis-
lators, against whose bulk successive capital statutes seemed mere petty annexes”
(197). Together with the Riot Act, he argued, it came to form “a model for subse-
quent terrorist legislation against disaffected Highlanders, Irish agrarian rebels and
English smugglers” (197). And of the men who enacted it? Such an Act could only
have been drawn up and pressed to service, he proposed, “by men who had formed
habits of mental distance and moral levity towards human life” (197). It responded
to an emergency, real or perceived, for sure, but it was a response that cannot be
explained by the emergency alone. Rather, he suggests, it was:
an emergency acting upon the sensibility of such men, for whom property
and the privileged status of the propertied were assuming, every year, a
greater weight in the scales of justice, until justice itself was seen as no
more than the outworks and defences of property and its attendant status.
(Thompson 1975, 197)
This, then, was the “trench[ing] around on every side by capital statutes” to which
he referred in his opening lines. The mindset itself, he suggested, was a peculiar fea-
ture of the Hanoverian Whigs, whom he described as “a curious junta of political
speculators and speculative politicians, stock-jobbers, officers grown fat on Marlbor-
ough’s wars, time-serving dependents in the law and the Church, and great landed
magnates” (198). That such a bunch, led on by the sinister Walpole, could have
achieved and held on to power was explained by Thompson by the dissolute state
of English politics at the time. In this mix, Whigs, despite their grasping and ava-
rice, were tolerated as possibly “the only alternative to civil war or to Stuart or
Catholic repossession of the island” (198). The law this Whig oligarchy had inher-
ited from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been forged in a conflict
with royal power. Its success as a strategy had been to place royal absolutism
“behind a high hedge of law” (263), securing and protecting the interests of the
new landed class against royal prerogative and arbitrary intervention. But what
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began as a defensive mechanism turned out also to be suitable as a tool for the
extension and protection of class interests, as the criminal law was recruited by the
propertied against the property-less. This, ultimately, is what Whigs and Hunters
described, in forensic detail.
In concluding his tale, Thompson observed “[w]e might be wise to end here”
(258). Had he done so, his book might have remained an articulate if somewhat
obscure footnote within the corpus of British social history. But he did not. Instead,
he sought to make some concluding observations on the importance and signifi-
cance of all this blood and suffering; on the travesty of justice wrought by cynical
and self-interested legislators and judges bringing forth terror in the name of class
interest. On the one hand, he suggested, there might be little significance to what
his study of the Black Act revealed. After all, he observed:
the story of a few lost common rights and of a few deer-stealers strung from
the gallows is a paltry affair when set beside the accounts of mass repression
of almost any day in the day-book of the twentieth century. . . . Did the vil-
lagers of Winkfield lose access to the peat within Swinley Rails? What is
that beside the liquidation of the kulaks? (Thompson 1975, 259)
On the other hand, and speaking to the Marxist brethren among whom he had
been a leading light, perhaps his study had taken far too long to say far too little
that could not be determined a priori. Thus:
to express surprise at the Black Act or at partial judges is—unless as con-
firmation and illustration of theories which might easily be demonstrated
without all this labour—simply to expose one’s own naivety. (Thompson
1975, 259–60)
But he sought, instead, a middle ground between these different justifications for
the irrelevance of his study. Taking the long view, he observed that the landed gen-
try of the eighteenth century had not simply used the system of law passed down to
them as a tool of terror and oppression. They had, by some means, also fashioned
that inheritance that we today regard as the rule of law, a bedrock of our society
and social order. Looking across the period, Thompson noted that the criminal law
worked most effectively as a tool of class oppression probably for not much more
than fifty years. Then, as broader social changes began to undercut the power of
Whig elites to capture the state as a vehicle for their own private interests, they
found themselves on the horns of a dilemma:
They could either dispense with the rule of law, dismantle their elaborate
constitutional structures, countermand their own rhetoric and exercise
power by force; or they could submit to their own rules and surrender
their hegemony. In the campaign against Paine and the printers, in the
Two Acts (1795), the Combination Acts (1799–1800), the repression of
Peterloo (1819) and the Six Acts (1820) they took halting steps in the
first direction. But in the end, rather than shatter their own self-image
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and repudiate 150 years of constitutional legality, they surrendered to the
law. (Thompson 1975, 269)
The significance of Thompson’s work lies in his efforts to tease out the enduring
legacy of this cultural moment. For it was a point when “the rulers [became], in
serious senses, whether willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric”
of law and thus subject to its rules (263). It was also and quite as importantly a
moment when “the ideology of the great struck root in a soil, however shallow, of
actuality” (264) and men and women who held ancient rights in custom began to
think of themselves as formal legal actors, turning to the law to reconcile their dif-
ferences and to seek redress for grievances.
To his Marxist colleagues who would see law as nothing more than an instru-
ment of class oppression he insisted that “there is a very large difference . . .
between arbitrary extra-legal power and the rule of law” (264–65). Indeed, after his
study of the bloody code he was not at all “starry eyed” (266) about the law. All
that is wrong with a law should indeed be exposed:
But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power
and the defense of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to
me to be an unqualified human good. (Thompson 1975, 266)
Indeed, he said, this process by which men and women at all levels of society
agreed to resolve conflicts through clearly elaborated rules and procedures, even if
these often only approximated to the ideal of justice, “seems to me a cultural
achievement of universal significance” (265). It was the capacity of these rules and
procedures to take on a life of their own, to escape the confines of hegemonic con-
trol, that ultimately led ordinary men and women to it. If the rhetoric of law
offered out hope of justice and evenhandedness, then it must to some degree be
allowed to do so. “If the law is evidently partial and unjust,” Thompson argued,
“then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class’s
hegemony” (263).
When these statements first appeared, they sparked enormous controversy
among legal historians and in the field of critical legal studies (see Horwitz 1977;
Cole 2001; Levinson and Balkin 2010). In a book review, which to date has itself
attracted more than 200 citations, Morton Horwitz (1977) exclaimed, “I do not see
how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as ‘an unqualified human
good’!” (566). Here the quality of Thompson’s research was a question largely set
aside (cf. Broad 1988) as thinkers of the left ranged against his critique of Marxist
structuralism reductionism. For it had been they who were in Thompson’s sights
when he urged the need to “resist any slide” into viewing the law as no more than
a tool of hierarchical class oppression and when he referenced the evidence of
twentieth-century totalitarianisms that should “have made clear even to the most
exalted thinker” the differences between unconstrained power and the rule of law
(264–65).
Yet Whigs and Hunters attracted and continues to attract little notice within
wider discussions of law and justice development. It is frequently cited in an
10 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
offhand sort of fashion as evidence of “history from below,” recovering voices of
plebeian classes otherwise overlooked in grand historical and institutional narra-
tives. Overall though, it is perhaps thought to be of questionable relevance to law
and justice problems of today. However, this is to miss exactly those contextual
insights that historical research has to offer. Moreover, if we look carefully to the
outworkings of global rule-of-law efforts and the problems they face, this picture
will surely change. So it is to these developments that we now turn.
GLOBAL RULE OF LAW: FACTS AND FAILURES
In late December 2015, a ground-breaking ceremony was held in Mogadishu,
the Somali capital, on the site of the soon-to-be-constructed Mogadishu Prison and
Court Complex (UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] 2015). Funded under
the UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Program, it is possibly the largest infrastruc-
ture project ever undertaken in the country. The court complex and attached
secure facilities form part of a wider effort to bring piracy suspects from across East
Africa to trial and to provide secure custodial facilities for medium- and high-risk
detainees. In nearby South Sudan, the world’s newest country, the state (re)building
process is to include development of a common law system, the conduct of which
will be in English. In support of this, the International Development Law Organiza-
tion (IDLO) has helped develop a new common law curriculum, provided training
and capacity support for the judiciary, and provided assistance toward the writing of
a national constitution (IDLO 2017).
In a separate compound in Juba, South Sudan’s capital, work is being directed
by the UN Development Program (UNDP) to ascertain the customary law of the
country’s various tribal and ethnic communities. Once these are known, it is
intended that their common principles should be distilled with a view, ultimately,
to find a way of knitting customary and statutory law into a coherent legal frame-
work (UNDP 2012a). Much of the planned work being undertaken by the UNDP
in South Sudan is modeled on previous efforts in Kenya, Malawi, and elsewhere in
Africa (UNDP 2015). Yet, as 2016 drew to a close, progress in South Sudan’s legal
redevelopment had been curtailed. For as so often seems to be the case, renewed
civil conflict and a general deterioration of the security situation across the country
had thrown plans awry.
It is against backdrops such as these that much contemporary rule-of-law
development work takes place. Programming runs the gamut from improving access
to justice (US Institute for Peace 2016) through development of community polic-
ing initiatives (Denney and Jenkins 2013), statutory drafting and legal and judicial
training and infrastructure, as indicated above, novel adjudication models, such as
drug courts (Haisley 2013), alternatives to imprisonment (UNODC 2007), and
human rights and gender-sensitive capacity building (Penal Reform International
2013). This is contemporary rule-of-law building in practice. There is almost
unconditional support for the idea in principle, even if how that is translated on
the ground may vary substantially from the ideal (for a Myanmar case study, see
Cheesman 2015). In a clear nod to E. P. Thompson, Brian Tamanaha (2004, 3)
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describes a wide acceptance that the rule of law is “good for everyone.” The idea,
he claims, finds a “unanimity in support” that is “unparalleled in history”: “[n]o
other single political idea has ever achieved global endorsement” in quite the same
way. For Tom Ginsburg (2010, 224), “[t]he rule of law is not only a philosopher’s
concept but a multi-billion dollar industry and the dominant ideal of our time.” It
is, he says, something that has “captured the policy-making imagination of the
West and become our modern mission civilisatrice.” In 2016, the UN Secretary Gen-
eral described it as “one of the foundations of progress in virtually all areas of our
work” and “an essential thread in the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment” (UN 2016).
Yet it is also clear that such widespread endorsement has not translated into an
easy transition from fragility and conflict to peace and happy statehood. Setting aside
the complex security and safety situations in places like South Sudan, Afghanistan,
Mali, and other contemporary hot spots, diagnoses of the failure of an English-style
rule of law to take root on foreign shores are various, but also variously pessimistic.
There is not space here to contemplate these diagnoses in their specific detail, other
than to observe that their multifactorial and multidimensional nature has to date
defied reduction into any general set of conclusions, or at least any that fit easily
with donors’ and programmers’ preferred response modes (see Pasara 2012; van Veen
and Price 2014; Independent Commission on Aid Impact 2015). Attempts at such
reduction have also often been less than satisfying. Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks
(2006, 9–10), for example, began with intimations of success: “the international com-
munity is finally beginning to have a sense of ‘best practices,’” they wrote, producing
“an increasingly nuanced understanding of what works and what doesn’t in post-
conflict settings.” What this turns out to be, however, is:
that there is no “one size fits all” template for rebuilding the rule of law
in post-conflict settings: to be successful, programs to rebuild the rule of
law must respect and respond to the unique cultural characteristics and
needs of each post-intervention society.
One thing we can do here is note that attempts to distill conclusions, where they
have advanced on this radical sui generis hypothesis, have tended overall to be tech-
nical or legally technocratic in nature. To the extent that the analysis is wider, it is
one that frequently jumps outside the realm of legality and penality altogether, posit-
ing (not unreasonably) the centrality of politics to the whole law-bringing, state-
building enterprise. Thus, Cassie Copeland (2015, 19), for example, observes of the
international community’s work in South Sudan that:
donors [have] generally programmed to the assumption that these [rule-of-
law] challenges were a result of low capacity, leading to a reliance on
technocratic solutions for many essentially political problems—with pre-
dictably poor outcomes. . . . Despite clear evidence, emerging over years,
that hundreds of millions of dollars of national-level, technocratic pro-
grammatic funding was not producing results, donors largely failed to re-
assess their framework of support.
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Martin Krygier has also noticed this entrenched focus on technical solutions, but his
conclusion draws us back in toward law rather than leapfrogging it altogether in favor
of political economy. Part of the problem, he asserts, is that contemporary approaches
are both planned and led by lawyers who, perhaps naturally, perhaps not, seem to
have an almost unshakeable focus on collecting “legal bric-a-brac for export and
installation” (2016, 18) rather than thinking about what law ultimately aims to do,
the ends of law itself. The bric-a-brac to which he refers are Copeland’s “technocratic
solutions,” often utilizing manualized intervention models, legal toolkits, and check-
lists (OHCHR 2006; UN 2011; Moderan 2015). In essence then, contemporary
approaches begin “with some particular box of legal tricks and [then identify] it as
the rule of law” (Krygier 2016, 487). Before hearing the conclusion of Krygier’s analy-
sis, however, it is worth noticing a second general feature of the way conclusions
within this domain have been drawn.
Here we may note that rule-of-law programming is shoehorned into an uneasy
alliance with, on the one hand, the state (or lack of it) as an object of international
development assistance and, on the other, the challenge posed by extant forms of
traditional justice or customary law. Building formal law is regarded as going hand
in hand with state form and capacity, yet each seems in practice to be undercut by
the power, position, and authority of nonstate, traditional, and religious sources of
authority and social ordering. In a report for the UNDP in 2006, Ewa Wojkowska
drew together a large of body of evidence to conclude that despite years of rule-of-
law programming, roughly 80 percent of inhabitants in fragile and conflict affected
states, places such as Malawi, Bangladesh, and Sierra Leone, seek justice through
informal, customary avenues. Furthermore, she noted, around 75 percent of all land
tenures in Africa are covered by customary jurisdiction, with this proportion rising
to 90 percent in places like Mozambique and Ghana (Wojkowska 2006). Nonstate
and informal law and justice actors have thus proven a problem to rule-of-law pro-
gramming and for a number of reasons. Principal among them, however, has been
this entwining of rule-of-law activities with the wider goal of liberal state building.
In Law’s Fragile State, Mark Massoud (2013, 4) describes the current programming
logic thus:
Contemporary law-building programs in fragile states operate on two pri-
mary assumptions about the law. First, the law is either tarnished or
entirely lacking in these places, and, second, through foreign assistance
and “capacity building” states may build up a legal order rooted in the
rule of law, to move from authoritarianism and war to democracy and
peace. . . . Ultimately the goal is to transform traditional or conflict-ridden
societies into modern, liberal states.
Yet as the presence of customary and informal justice mechanisms ipso facto indi-
cate, wild places may often seem lawless, but that does not mean they are entirely
without law or, indeed, visions of justice. Unfortunately, these forms of law seldom
work through or integrate well with the top-down mechanisms of formal, state-
based law, and nor do they necessarily comply with international norms around
human rights, especially those of women and girls, ethnic and religious minorities,
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and so on (UNDP 2012b). The result has been for rule-of-law programmers to ques-
tion whether some wild places are in fact ready for law and justice as “we” conceive
it. In one variation, this is reflected in a questioning of the idea of the state itself.
The Danish Institute for International Studies, for example, has proposed that since
“[n]on-state actors are the primary providers of justice and security in the Global
South where they deal with an estimated 80 to 90 percent of disputes . . . it is nec-
essary to rethink the state-centric agenda” (Albrecht and Kyed 2010, 1). In another
variation, customary law is presented as an inescapable reality given the weakness
of the state. A recent report on rule of law in Mali, for example, suggested a rap-
prochement between formal and customary law in the short-to-medium term (ten
to twenty years) before an ultimate ascendency of state-based law into the longer
term (twenty to forty years):
Accepting that the Malian state does not have, will not have and should
not aspire to have a monopoly on the provision of justice for the next few
decades is a critical starting point for making improvements to how justice
is provided in matters that affect Malians in their daily lives. (van Veen,
Goff, and van Damme 2015, 3)
The main problem for state builders posed by the presence of informal, nonstate,
and customary legal actors and mechanisms is that too little is known about how to
connect them with higher order (state and international) norms of justice and
human rights. As Erica Harper, a leading figure in this field, notes, the largest
“concern is the yawning gap between the proliferation of customary justice pro-
gramming and the evidence and knowledge base on which such programming is
grafted” (Harper 2011, 14). A signal feature of contemporary rule-of-law program-
ming, then, is this contrast between top-down, formal law, associated with the
Westphalian state on the one hand, and on the other a plural order of authorities
distributed across tribal and religious domains that transcend not only sovereign
state borders, but also the temporal or cosmological frames within which modern
statecraft and its laws are situated.
So what, if anything, might E. P. Thompson’s work on law and justice in
eighteenth-century England add to all this? Can it assist in resolving these conun-
drums of how to advance the rule of law and citizen security in the Global South?
We may begin to answer this by returning to Martin Krygier’s analysis of rule-of-
law failure and the problems of conceiving law and justice as technocratic prob-
lems. For what Krygier (2016) concluded was that Thompson’s work in fact adds
quite a lot. The problem with much contemporary activity aimed at building law
and justice, he suggests, is that these approaches head in an almost completely
opposite direction to the insights gained by Thompson’s study of eighteenth-century
England. Whereas Thompson in his final analysis shifted attention away from the
virtues or otherwise of particular legal strategies so as to look at the rule of law for
what it broadly achieved—“the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and
the defense of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims” (Thompson 1975,
266)—contemporary programming is damned by its myopia and failure to grasp
what law ultimately stands for: taming and restraining arbitrary power. But while
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this “eye on the prize” reminder is almost certainly correct, it does not take us
closer to solving the key problem law bringers and state builders face. This is the
from-scratch and please-deliver-tomorrow aspect of the contemporary problem
space. Rule-of-law programmers and practitioners cannot solve it partly because
they inhabit it. But partly also they cannot solve it because they have been blind
to the work and lessons of a previous era of law bringing and state (though not
nation) building.
RULE OF LAW: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL REFLECTIONS
E. P. Thompson’s ruminations on the importance of rule-governed and proce-
dural justice have attracted much attention from historians and postcolonial
scholars. In some instances, they have been no less outraged by his conclusions on
the achievements and virtues of law than was the critical legal scholar Morton
Horwitz (1977). In Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial
India, for example, Ranajit Guha accused Thompson of being beguiled by the
“hallucinatory effects” of rule of law’s own ideology. How else to explain, he
asked, that “a cultural development of the bourgeoisie limited to a particular
national experience should be hailed as an ‘achievement of universal signifi-
cance’” (1998, 68)? With less fanfare, the noted South Asianist D. A. Washbrook
simply declined to set his work in the context established by Thompson’s Whigs
and Hunters: “The differing historical and historiographical contexts of Indian
study,” he said, “make straight translation invalid” (1981, 649). Nevertheless,
colonial and postcolonial scholars’ engagement with the problem of rule of law
and, specifically, with Thompson’s work has been enormously productive. In its
connection with the history and experience of bringing new, formal, state-
centered law into contact with what were recognized as traditional and customary
legal environments it has much to say. It will be convenient to begin with
responses to Thompson’s claims about law in Whigs and Hunters, before moving to
a wider evaluation of what colonial rule of law might teach us.
The most significant engagement with Whigs and Hunters in a colonial context
is to be found in the final chapter of Lauren Benton’s (2002) Law and Colonial Cul-
tures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900. There, in addition to defending
Thompson against Guha’s misrepresentations, Benton evaluates the relevance to
colonial and postcolonial scholars of Thompson’s claims about the significance of
law, before suggesting how her own work and that of poststructuralists such as
Pierre Bourdieu might further develop the picture. For Benton, the fundamental
problem Thompson had before him was to explain how the apparent impartiality of
legal formalism, giving out the hope, however slim, of justice for England’s plebeian
classes, produced a “leap from this glimmer of hope to a generalized acceptance of
the rule of law” and then why this “was the product neither of false consciousness
nor of simple miscalculation” (Benton 2002, 256). Thompson’s answer, she con-
cludes, is no more than that customary notions of rights and usage norms were suffi-
ciently legal in character that the emerging “plural legal order contained within it
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the power of mutual recognition” (256). In this way the grid of formal law and the
grid of customary law intersected, drawing lower social orders toward formal law.
For Benton, this conclusion remains partial and thus unsatisfactory. Indeed,
she says, Thompson’s failure to go further “in his critique of ‘structural reduction-
ism’, the idea that law can be reduced merely to an instrument of oppression, is to
my mind much larger as a shortcoming than his quip about the universal goodness
of the rule of law” (256). In Bourdieu she finds a better account of how individuals
engage with structures like law: “It is possible simultaneously to use imposed law
(thereby reaffirming it) and to seek to undermine its authority” (258). But that
brings us “only a little father than with E. P. Thompson toward an understanding
of the production of legal legitimacy through legal conflict” (258).
The resonances with contemporary rule-of-law questions in programming for
fragile and conflict-affected states should by now be clear. Extending that relevance
still further, Benton goes on to make a number of powerful suggestions about the
state itself. This, she says, is where Bourdieu cannot help and where Guha’s
“approach goes wrong” (258): it is in missing the significance of the colonial state
as a still yet-to-be entity:
Colonial states did not in an important sense exist as states in the early
centuries of colonialism. They did not claim or produce a monopoly on
legal authority or on the assignment of political and legal identity. Indeed,
colonial conditions often intensified the fluidity of the legal order. . . .
There was dominance, undeniably, but both colonizing and colonized
groups were not irrational or deluded when they sought advantage in the
fractured qualities of rule. (Benton 2002, 259, original emphasis)
Lauren Benton’s global study of empires across 500 years provides two important
developments to Thompson’s vision. First, as the excerpt above illustrates, the
importance of state-centered and formal law does not require the a priori existence
of a state in the liberal, Westphalian sense. Nor are the contesting sites of authority
that plural legal spheres entail necessarily inimical to state formation. More
recently, Paul Halliday (2013, 268–69) has made the same point: “Early modern
states,” he observes, “in their cores and on their peripheries, became strong not by
squelching plurality, and thereby approximating the unity apparently required
by our Hobbesian and Westphalian expectations. They became strong because of
plurality” (original emphasis).
What Benton’s work thus suggests is that the instability, uncertainty, and fluid-
ity of multiple legal jurisdictions in effect creates the demand that the state as a
state emerges to satisfy. But how so? Her second conclusion answers this. The state
emerges as the paramount authority within a plural legal order by dint of its claim
to arbitrate upon questions of legal ordering and by the predictability of outcomes
under its own state-centered contribution to the plural legal mix. Looking across
continents and over centuries, she concludes that the foreignness of this state-
centric law was in fact an advantage, a conclusion quite contrary to many claims
within the contemporary development sector. To be sure, “the state-centered qual-
ity of the legal order was itself new,” but, and here she agrees with Thompson, it
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was the capacity of the state to administer justice “with any degree of consistency
or standards” that elevated it over other, possibly more precarious, options:
“Procedure trumped justice; institutions outlived bandits” (260).
More recent work has confirmed this conclusion. In a study of corruption in
the “native” lower courts of Burma at the turn of the twentieth century, for exam-
ple, Jonathan Saha (2012, 217–18) concludes that “colonial law can be seen as a
set of practices that were constitutive of the colonial state” and so it was “through
people’s experiences of and engagement with legal institutions and practices [that]
the colonial state, as an imagined entity, was made in every day life.” He, too, fol-
lows Thompson and Benton in observing the importance of the “material effects” of
colonial justice, thus ensuring that the “benevolence” the rule of law offered “was
not purely rhetorical” (193).
Once more echoing E. P. Thompson, Elizabeth Kolsky (2010, 13), in a study
of white-on-native violence in British India, concludes that “while the legal system
may not have been equal or impartial,” the effect of “the promise of colonial
justice” was to “restrict the gross exercise of power by offering a language and a
means to imprison India’s rulers within their own rhetoric.” Mark Massoud (2013,
224), in his study of British rule in Sudan agrees, remarking upon Thompson’s
observation that law becomes a constraint upon the exercise of arbitrary power that
“[m]y findings about colonial law in Sudan come to a similar conclusion.” Finally,
in a study of colonial rule of law in the Indian province of Punjab, we hear David
Gilmartin (2009, 8) echoing Thompson’s familiar phrasing:
But the courts nevertheless had sufficient independence, and challenged
the state just frequently enough, that the notion of the law (and of
records) as a source of authority superior to the immediate whims of offi-
cials gained significant purchase on the popular imagination.
The process by which ordinary colonial subjects chose between legal jurisdictions
has come to be termed forum shopping (Schapper 2012). This refers to legal forum
selection, of course, but the term also references legal actors’ recognition that differ-
ent forums might serve their self-interest better or worse. In a study of marriage
cases in colonial India, Mitra Sharafi (2010, 988) observes just how wide the range
of legal options open to Indians could be:
All this—the personal law system of religious law, custom, neighboring
and princely jurisdictions, the many legal links to England and Scotland,
and the legal systems of other European colonizers who had ceded terri-
tory to the British—created an opulent feast of legal options for potential
litigants.
In the end, however, she reaches a conclusion “along the lines of what E. P.
Thompson proposed for England” and Lauren Benton for empires globally. She thus
explains formal colonial law’s “relative success with colonized populations” (982),
and indeed its “reinforced . . . hold on subjects,” through the attractions of law’s
own formal character: in other words, “by dangling before [Indians] the possibility
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of individual relief through rule of law proceduralism” (980). That proceduralism
offered not only the possibility that justice would be delivered on the day, but also
recourse to higher courts and external arbiters running all the way to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. Indeed, as Mitch Fraas (2014) has illustrated in
the context of colonial India and Bonny Ibhawoh (2013) in respect of British
Africa, the presence of Privy Council adjudication created a kind of second-order
brake on “the exercise of unmediated force” that Thompson described, providing
another means to “inhibit power and afford some protection to the powerless”
(Thompson 1975, 266) across a range of legal forums within the British colonial
domain.
One fault line running through this literature, however, has been the signifi-
cantly different character of rule under the two principal forms imperialism took.
These are what Kwasi Kwarteng (2010, 7) in his study of Britain’s postcolonial
legacies, Ghosts of Empire, distinguishes as “the colonial empire” versus “the white
dominions,” or settler societies. For relevance to modern rule-of-law dilemmas it
is the former that would seem most important, though there also exists a signifi-
cant literature on the latter worthy of notice (see McLaren 2015). Part of the dif-
ficulty, prima facie, of reconciling the relevance of colonial empires might seem
to be their fundamentally authoritarian character. Kwarteng reiterates the oft-
made point that “[n]otions of democracy could not have been further from the
minds of imperial administrators” (2010, 6–7). He describes British colonialism as
instead operating a form of “benign authoritarianism,” which we might otherwise
understand as a paternalist, but ultimately despotic form of government in the
sense described by J. S. Mill (1861) in Considerations on Representative Government.
Taking the example of Hong Kong, Kwarteng argues that though clearly nondem-
ocratic, it was also “probably the most successful exercise in benevolent dictator-
ship in history” (379).
This gives rise to questions about the contemporary connection between and
even conflation of the goals of introducing rule of law and democratic liberal state-
hood. John McLaren (2015, 34) recognizes this and speaks of the need to
“disentangle the history of the Rule from modern presentist interpretations that
link it uncritically with democracy.” Similarly, in an against-the-grain thought piece
titled “In Defense of Imperialism?” Tom Ginsburg argues that it is precisely the
absence of strong authoritarian control within the societies toward which rule-of-
law programs are directed that fatally undermines any hope of effectiveness. These
days, he concludes, “[w]e are insufficiently imperialistic to carry out social transfor-
mation from abroad” (2010, 225).
Fleshing out his argument, Ginsburg utilizes Weingast’s distinction between
self-enforcing democracies, in which rules are followed and all power holders acqui-
esce to their primacy, and external enforcement, wherein international or foreign
actors take up the role of ultimate guarantors that legal and democratic processes
are adhered to. Developing the latter, as is commonly required in fragile and post-
conflict states, tends to undermine development of the former, though that is the
principal feature of the democratic liberal statehood we seek to introduce. To untie
this Gordian knot, Ginsburg suggests an examination of our own history. Most
states that have developed effective democratic and rule-of-law structures generally
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began to do so via forms of authoritarian government or authoritarian law.
“Indeed,” he observes:
surveying members of the OECD as the most successful exemplars of
democracy and the rule of law, one sees only a handful (Switzerland,
along with settler societies such as the United States, Australia and Israel)
that did not experience a long stage of authoritarian state building before
developing the rule of law. (Ginsburg 2010, 235)
Moreover, he notes, this holds for former colonizers and postcolonial states alike:
“many societies do attribute a positive legacy to colonial legal structures—take
Hong Kong, Singapore or Malaysia, to name a few former British colonies”
(236). Thus, rule-of-law promoters, he argues, need to recognize the internal
conflict within their goals of introducing independence, democracy, and order
simultaneously. “External intervention in the name of the rule of law and
democracy has promised a good deal,” he concludes, but “[i]t has delivered very
little” (238).
RETHINKING LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND THE STATE
If contemporary writers as varied as the legal theorist Tom Ginsburg (2010)
and practitioners van Veen, Goff, and van Damme (2015), who it will be recalled
placed formal law’s effective writ in Mali some forty years into the future, are
despondent over the capacity of legal transformation and liberal state making to be
effected together, what, if anything, could dusty old colonial history add? The
answer is quite a lot, in fact. There is now an extensive literature on the relation-
ship between law, governance, and state making under colonialism that places the
foregoing insights about legal change in a larger context. Broadly, what this litera-
ture identifies is the central role of law in imperial expansion, from its force as an
ideological justification to its role as a key vehicle through which colonial gover-
nance was exercised.
Importantly, though, this was not a one-way street. So, what the literature also
reveals is the central role of imperial experience in the development of Western
ideas about the liberal state as a general, and generalizable, form. Part of this litera-
ture tells us what colonial powers did wrong. Like the structural reductionists so
outraged by Thompson’s work, for some writers in this literature the service law did
to colonialism taints it fundamentally. Martin Chanock, for example, describes law
was a “weapon” that operated as “the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of
the power of an alien state and part of the process of coercion.” (1985, 4). Simi-
larly, John Comaroff developed the neologism “lawfare,” which he describes as “the
effort to conquer and control indigenous peoples by the coercive use of legal means”
(2001, 306).
In making claims of this sort, writers have in some senses been doing no more
than reflect what colonial officials had already said; particularly those of the later
nineteenth century. One such, James Fitzjames Stephen, an influential English jurist
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and law member of the Governor General of India’s Legislative Council, for exam-
ple, wrote that:
law is in fact the sum and substance of what we have to teach them.
It is, so to speak, the gospel of the English, and it is a compulsory gos-
pel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience. (Stephen 1876,
168–69)
Legal, political, and colonial historians have spilled much ink analyzing this cogni-
tive structure of imperial rule (see particularly Mehta 1999; Matena 2010; Mukher-
jee 2010; Bell 2012; Dorsett and McLaren 2014).
The deep imbrication of the theory and practice of colonialism with the devel-
opment of political liberalism as a general form, noted earlier, has been an impor-
tant conclusion. Thus, the liberalism to which the contemporary term liberal state
refers is a creature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that perhaps much
more so than is commonly recognized was conceived in intimate relationship to
colonial governance. One of liberalism’s chief architects, John Stuart Mill, was for
most of his working life an employee of the British East India Company, a private
corporation that from at least 1765 through to 1858 conquered territory and ruled
India largely as would a sovereign state (Zastoupil 1994; Stern 2013). As the com-
pany’s rule faltered in the wake of the great uprising of 1857–1858, Mill drafted in
its name a petition to Parliament on the virtues of this form of rule and followed it
with a much longer treatise on the improved condition of India under this (private)
colonial yoke (Mill 1858).
Mill had in fact followed his father into both employment at the company and
an interest in the social ordering of societies. The elder Mill’s three-volume History
of British India, published in 1817, was an influential account of British conquest,
partly because of the stark manner in which it laid out a teleology of progress and
civilizational hierarchy that came to underwrite colonial domination and remains at
the heart of liberalism (see Mehta 1999). Thus, when van Veen, Goff, and van
Damme (2015) write of contemporary Malian society as a fractured polity, unable
on the one hand to agree on basic norms of justice and on the other to act in a dis-
passionate fashion when faced with intertribal rivalries, they could as well be echo-
ing the reports of a thousand colonial administrators whose reports and memos lie
at the heart of liberal theory and liberalism’s vision of the developmental state (see
Mill 1861, Ch. 1).
Tensions that today play out across the law and development sector, such as in
balancing the authoritarian tendencies of so-called big-man political leaders, their
desire to shore up frail systems of political allegiance through networks of patron-
age, the global normative claims of multilateral actors and international and
regional rights-based instruments, and debates over the appropriate extent of inva-
sion by modern norms and economics into traditional communities, all of these
were present too within the legal and political spaces of imperial rule. Often, too,
they coexisted in a fractious and, as has so often been pointed out, incoherent bal-
ance that subscribed to ideas only for them to be overrun or deeply attenuated by
the exigencies of rule.
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While sailing back to England after his stint as legal member on the Viceroy’s
Legislative Council, J. F. Stephen penned a kind of manifesto for these bitter les-
sons of practice. Titled Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, it was a thoroughgoing critique
of Mill’s liberalism as it had been tested in the fire of Indian colonial administra-
tion. Stephen, an authoritarian liberal, felt that he must counter that “side of
[Mill’s] teaching which is as repugnant as the rest of it is attractive to me” (1874,
53). In particular, Stephen argued for a vision of the liberal state built not around
individual freedom but resting instead on state authority and stability: “power pre-
cedes liberty,” he argued. Thus:
liberty, from the very nature of things, is dependent upon power; and it is
only under the protection of a powerful, well-organised, and intelligent
government that any liberty can exist at all. (Stephen 1874, 166)
Part of the utility of examining colonial history, then, lies in the capacity to exam-
ine, across a multitude of varying contexts, social forms, and arrangements, prob-
lems of precisely the order van Veen, Goff, and van Damme describe, and the
thinking and strategies that that experience produced. Perhaps the most important
insight this will provide is the recognition that, notwithstanding instances to the
contrary, colonial law making and state building was not all lawfare and coercion,
and often it was much more. Even for administrators like Stephen, who viewed a
powerful government as a precondition to viable statehood, only after which could
liberty rights then be extended, law and lawful rule was still a critical ingredient.
Providing an alternative inflection on the idea of law and war, Stephen noted that
governmental strength often inclined officials toward a kind of petty despotism, to
exercise personal and thus arbitrary power in the name of government. This was
nowhere more likely than on the frontier, where exigency made powerful demands.
Yet the task of governing a “turbulent and primitive district” should, he argued,
best be understood as akin to that of a “highly civilised and carefully selected mili-
tary force on active service.” In such a circumstance, laws were like the “orders and
articles of war,” so “to say that law is out of place in a rough district is the very
same absurdity as to say that discipline and distinct and definite orders are out of
place on a rough campaign.” Recognizing law’s role in constraining arbitrary power,
Stephen thus concluded that ultimately “law comes to be a rule rather for the ruler
himself than for the subject” (Legislative Department 1898, 80).
The remainder of this article attempts to pick out some of the salient features
of this other, less seen or understood, side of what colonialism did and to identify
insights that seem, prima facie, relevant to the present day. While it might be
tempting to try to rank these by importance, no ordinal scale could adequately cap-
ture the overlapping character of processes and practices of governance to be
described. Yet at the same time, it does seem possible to offer a rough categorical
schema. So we may begin with some brief notes on the context and character of the
societies from which our historical observations are drawn. Next we can begin to
make some more detailed and apposite observations about targets and methods
adopted by colonial administrations and what we may draw from that. Finally, there
is the matter of what colonial administrators drew from their own colonial experience
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and digested to form maxims of law and governance that we might profit from
understanding better today. Since all this might quickly become quite abstract, the
following sections work as far as possible with rule-of-law development in one colo-
nial context, that being India in general and, where possible, its northern province
of Punjab in particular.
Context and Character
To begin, we may observe that the context of rule of law’s emergence in
England and of the colonial experiences discussed by Lauren Benton (2002) and
others was of a similar character to that faced today in fragile and postconflict
states. Writing of England in the 1720s, Thompson said the country at that
moment “had something of the sick quality of a banana republic”:
This is a recognized phase of commercial capitalism when predators fight
for the spoils of power and have not yet agreed to submit to rational or
bureaucratic rules and forms. Every politician by nepotism, interest and
purchase, gathered around him a following of loyal dependents. The aim
was to reward them by giving them some post in which they could milk
some part of the public revenue. . . . Every post carried its perquisites, per-
centages, commissions, receipts of bribes, its hidden spoils. . . . The great
gentry, speculators and politicians were men of huge wealth whose
incomes towered like the Andes above the rain-forests of common man’s
poverty. (Thompson 1975, 197–98)
Many colonial contexts were similar, but perhaps even less stable. Looking back to
the development of a functioning state and system of state-centered law in the
Indian Punjab following British annexation in 1849, we find a quintessential post-
conflict environment. It was characterized by an almost complete absence of state
structures, a largely rural, traditional, and poor agrarian society retaining distinctive
nomadic elements (both cultural and economic), at least three different religious
communities, and a huge variety of customary law norms and presumptive usage
rights. British administrators desired to lay at least a basic framework of justice over
the whole territory as a first step.
What was done in the Punjab came to be recognized by the British as a model,
a template, for how to bring peace, order, law, and a functioning state to a conquered
territory (see, generally, Gilmartin 2009) and much of that structure remains today.
Understanding better what went on in specific locations like the Punjab would seem,
prima facie, to be a worthwhile enterprise, since it took in the gamut of state-
building and law-making activities from developing methods for the ascertaining and
recording of customary law, to determining appropriate, culturally satisfactory forms
of property title, to questions of ascertaining lex loci, to a complex history of dealing
with problems of land alienation, civil rights for women and children, and so on.
Second, as E. P. Thompson described for England and Benton (2002) and
others have observed in colonial situations, neither legal plurality nor weak extant
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state structures seem themselves to have been a bad thing or indeed to be, in a
sense, abnormal, in state and law development. Looking across many colonial con-
texts, Benton (2002, 258) speaks of “the production of legal legitimacy through
legal conflict.” Much more needs to be understood about how that was achieved.
Again, the Punjab has intricately detailed records of how formal and customary law
were brought together (see Tupper 1881; Government of Punjab 1915), something
that the UNDP, for example, in its current work in South Sudan could well benefit
from understanding better. Even a brief examination of the Punjab experience
brings up insights of relevance to contemporary programming.
The question of timeframes, for example, remains a vexed one: donors fre-
quently expect a three-to-five-year results plan; the OECD has recently made the
apparently radical suggestion for six-to-ten-year project durations (OECD 2016); yet
research by the World Bank found that a one standard deviation movement in indi-
cators took on average forty-one years to achieve in the twenty fastest reforming
developing states it measured (World Bank 2011). How long did it take to draw for-
mal state-led and informal customary law together in the Punjab and for a more for-
mal state structure to emerge? Of course, there is no specific number. But what the
historical analysis offers is an insight into the contingency of such change, being
the sorts of potentially unforeseeable factors that interrupted, shaped, and propelled
the development of law and state structures in the Punjab.
Targets and Methods
Contemporary thinking linking rule-of-law development and state building has
a kind of tunnel vision on democratization. As Kwasi Kwarteng (2010) and so
many others before him have observed, colonial states’ interests lay elsewhere.
Where that was, was in the area of revenue. Thus, unlike contemporary state-
building approaches that produce aid-dependent zombie states, colonial states or
provinces were required to be fiscally self-sufficient. Law, therefore, was closely tied
to revenue settlements and those settlements were, certainly in the paradigmatic
colonial case of British India, almost always tied to the land. Taxation is only now
and very weakly beginning to appear on the radar of development and rule-of-law
programmers (Eubank 2012; OECD 2014; Asongu 2015). Yet determining land
ownership, ascribing title either individually or in common, and assessing tax obli-
gations were key activities of early colonial state formation. Across the colonial
field, administrators drew their subjects in to law by creating justiciable rights: to
land, but so, too, to inheritance, to divorce, to widow remarriage, and so on. Thus,
property rights and tax obligations emerged, but at the same time important social
and civil rights were conferred. This alien, formal law was, to use Thompson’s
(1975, 265) phrase, “something a great deal more than a sham.”
So how would rule-of-law and state building look if revenue, property rights,
and other forms of justiciable entitlement were placed at the center, rather than
the democratic processes that are now widely recognized (Kupferschmidt 2009;
Villaveces-Izquierdo and Burcher 2013; Briscoe and Goff 2016) as encouraging
graft, rent seeking, and susceptibility to organized crime? Indeed, is it possible, and
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if so what form would it take, to have a liberal state that does not have as its first
characteristic pure democratic forms? Certainly, all this was not only deeply and
thoughtfully considered in the connections between nineteenth-century colonialism
and an emerging liberal theory, but many of the precepts of different liberal state
forms were tested in practice as well (Brown 2014, Chs. 4, 5).
A second question of targets and methods concerns the now almost forgotten
fact that introducing law and making a state is, literally, a creative exercise. Thus,
though we are all familiar with theoretical arguments about the way law creates
new objects, concepts, rights, and so on, we seem much less easy in practice with
the conjuring into existence of legal entitlements, such as property rights, where
none have gone before. Part of the difficulty appears to be that in tasks like the
ascertainment of customary law (Hinz 2012; UNDP 2012a) it is often less than
clear that local, often tribal, interlocutors comprehend exactly what they are being
asked to report on. This may reflect a mismatch of concepts or the fact that no def-
inite right, in the sense of a formal legal right, rather than the capacity to exercise
power or make moral claim, has previously existed in the domain under
investigation.
Further, it is unclear what might happen if such rights are established; what
the knock-on and unforeseen impacts might be. In both these cases, the Punjab
experience offers insights. It is clear, for example, that bringing some rights into
existence involves a degree of creation that goes beyond simple recognition or for-
malization. In 1867, for example, Punjab administrators faced the problem that,
nearly twenty years after the first settlement of property rights and revenue (tax)
obligations, it appeared some communities contested the original assessment’s verac-
ity. Weighing in on the affair, Henry Maine, the law member of the Governor
General’s Council, observed that:
[Punjab administrators] of the greatest knowledge of the country and of
undoubted earnestness and good faith make positively contradictory state-
ments on what ought to be a matter of fact capable of being established,
while enquiries conducted at intervals of fifteen or twenty years appear to
give diametrically opposite results . . . [in contrast with] the permanent
settlement of Bengal proper, which was an avowed imitation of English
institutions, [and that] has proved to have more stability and has been
less attacked and questioned than systems purporting to be based on the
ancient customs and tenures of the people. (Maine 1892, 118)
The indefiniteness of those ancient customs and tenures was central to Maine’s
assessment of precolonial Indian society and the difficulty of introducing a rights-
based order into it. However, as Tim Allen (2010; Allen and Macdonald 2014) has
observed of modern-day Uganda, much of what passes for tradition and custom in
such communities is not at all traditional but invented to suit current needs based
on ideas or memories of a supposed traditional past (on invention, see Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983). Despite these sorts of problems, Punjab administrators did man-
age to fashion and progressively to refine highly localized assessments, often ren-
dered right down to the hamlet level, of a whole host of customary rights and
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usages upon which a new society, connected now to the wider Indian and global
economy, grew and flourished. The detail and contingency of that development was
immense (Robertson 1893; Kaul 1992), pointing to the need for similarly multidi-
mensional thinking and planning in contemporary rule-of-law and development
contexts.
Finally, we may ask how the putative lessons of colonial practice could achieve
their effects. In other words, does form alone drive function? The question is far
from academic. Many postcolonial states have seen established colonial-era legal
systems pressed into service by dictators and rapacious elites in a way that questions
Thompson’s description of law as an “unqualified human good.” In an incisive study
of Sudan’s colonial and postcolonial life, for example, Mark Massoud (2013, 214)
concurs with Lauren Benton’s conclusions on the constitutive role of law: “law and
legal strategies are the building blocks of statehood—even fragile statehood,” he
says. But at the same time, the Sudanese experience suggests that activities “that
reinforce the authority and power of legal institutions are more likely to sustain an
authoritarian state than to usher in a new era of democratic rule, at least in the
short term” (215). Thus, in the “vexing case” of Sudan, law’s capacity to constrain
arbitrary power “has surely been overshadowed by the dark times when a ruling des-
pot wielded law like a criminal positions a bullet into his gun” (230).
Nick Cheesman (2015) has made similar observations based on Opposing the
Rule of Law: How Myanmar’s Courts Make Law and Order, focusing on the asymme-
try of desires for rule of law versus order. Different but not unrelated questions
about the relationship of legal forms to outcomes can be found in the legal trans-
plantation literature (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2013). Certainly, the
observations made here are important and the impact of them may be to draw our
historical gaze outward from the colonial lens and toward a broader one, including
examining postcolonial transitions (Sherman, Gould, and Ansari 2014). This would
usefully sharpen the focus on legal transformation. It would also direct attention to
the success or failure of new citizens in constraining elite power and securing liberty
rights in the postcolony (Brown 2016).
Colonial Experience
Thompson’s account of England and those of scholars interested in the colo-
nial periphery converge on a conclusion about law that should prompt a radical
rethink of the way rule-of-law programs are designed. Current thinking, perhaps
influenced by Tom Tyler’s (1990) seminal work on procedural justice, Why People
Obey the Law, seems to imagine formal law as something individuals must deign to
accept. The terminology used is one of acquiescence. Caroline Sage and Michael
Woolcock (2013, 6), for example, explain that laws are a social invention and as
such “draw their salience and strength from the acquiescence of those using them.”
Similarly, Anna Macdonald and Tim Allen (2015, 305) “point out” that laws are
“deeply complex social and political interventions, which rely on the ‘acquiescence’
and voluntary compliance of those they are designed to benefit.” This does not at
all capture how law was understood in British India, nor does it chime with
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Thompson’s account of England. In these cases, people engaged with formal law
because it offered at least the hope of best serving their self-interests. Thus, a signal
conclusion about colonial uses of law was administrators’ recognition of the impor-
tance of self-interest as a force drawing people toward its formal structures. The
vigor of civil litigation among the colonized was often regarded as evidence that
social transformation was taking place: “It has been the constant aim of the Punjab
Administration,” wrote its Judicial Commissioner in 1855, just six years after war
ended, “to throw open the Courts of Justice to the mass of the population. Increas-
ing litigation would seem to show, that people are not slow to employ the opportu-
nity thus offered them” (Government of Punjab 1855, v).
Lauren Benton, in her study of 500 years of colonial law, identified this center-
ing of formal law and its forums, the courts of justice, as a significant marker of
social transformation in colonial polities. Such centering, she suggests, “shaped a
juridical space for the state and brought participants into a single discourse about
the law” (2002, 261). What we find in these colonial contexts, then, are important
case studies of the way state building is led by an emerging imagination and under-
standing of formal law and its forums as a shared space of political and legal com-
munity: a space, moreover, where self-interest could be pursued and where
outcomes, dictated by rules and procedures rather than caste or clan, gender, or
age, were at some minimal level perceived to be just and enforceable. Thus, one of
the primary lessons of colonial experience is that formal law is important to the cre-
ation of political community and what draws people to that law is their perception
of it as a site for the exercise of (legal) strategies for the satisfaction of their self-
interest. This might be hastened, as the Punjab administrators recognized and as
Lauren Benton, too, has observed, by a strategic approach to reform within plural
legal orders: “we might unapologetically identify especially active litigation forums,”
she says, “as places where small reforms can reach large audiences” (2013, 31).
Next, since none of this would seem to square neatly with a reductionist vision
of colonial lawfare and coercive oppression, we should begin to search out the other
less told but no less important histories of colonial law. Returning to the Punjab
once again, one important thread of administrative emphasis stands out. It does so
because it lent support to existing social structures and forms of livelihood, while at
the same time putting in place mechanisms that changed Punjab from being a back-
ward province to the agrarian powerhouse of India, where it has since remained. Ian
Talbot (1991, 210) writes that “[b]y the 1920s [the Punjab district of] Sargodha had
grown to one of the largest wheat markets in the world.” By then, Punjab was pro-
ducing “a tenth of British India’s total cotton crop and a third of its wheat.” By the
1980s, he reports, “[d]espite possessing less than a thirtieth of the total population, it
was producing around two thirds of the entire procurement of wheat and over a half
that of rice” (216). Quite arguably this was no trick of fate, nor an unintended conse-
quence of totalizing, coercive colonial lawfare upon the Punjab population.
How were such effects brought about? One suggestion is a self-conscious colo-
nial theory of practice. Having learned important lessons from the sometimes ruin-
ous effects of the eighteenth century’s Bengal settlement, and now with a better
understanding of “native” social and economic structures, Punjab administrators
came to view the peasant cultivator as the rock upon which Punjab society rested.
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The history of protections extended to this yeoman class—against alienation of
land and property by money lenders or urban elites, or against other forces per-
ceived to destabilize rural social structures and community harmony—makes
instructive reading.
What the history of colonial management of land tenure in the Punjab illus-
trates, then, is that much colonial law was in fact not authoritarian, not designed
to suppress or oppress but to protect, to promote social stability, and to encourage
economic progress (see especially Darling 1928; Islam 1985; Kaul 1992). The
rule-of-law literature’s tendency to use colonial as a grab-all term for oppressive
forms of indirect rule associated with late-colonial Africa is thus deeply problem-
atic. It gives effect to what Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao (2011, 87) warn of as a
“partial or flawed understanding” of the past, so often “used to suit predetermined
purposes, and to be largely unverified” (75). Indeed, unlike E. P. Thompson’s
(1975, 21) metropolitan case study, where property was “trenched around on
every side by capital statutes” and where his collaborator Douglas Hay (1975, 35)
wrote of “a criminal law that was nine-tenths concerned with upholding a radical
division of property,” what we find in colonial Punjab is something quite
different.
What emerge there are detailed analyses seeking to tease apart how the crea-
tion of property rights in land of previously little value, in combination with the
opening up of those communities to wider economic forces, created the paradox of
both rising wealth and rising indebtedness: hence the title of M. L. Darling’s (1928)
still widely respected treatise on the subject, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and
Debt. As these very same processes are set in place across the contemporary devel-
opment sector, careful reflection on a century of Punjab experience would seem
likely to repay the effort. What it would also do is provide gamed-out case studies
of where such efforts worked, failed, or produced counterintuitive results.
Examples can be found right across the rule-of-law sphere, with many relevant
to the contemporary human rights space. One example is the Hindu Widows’
Remarriage Act 1856, which, despite reformist and progressive intentions, had the
unintended effect of severely reducing the economic chances of lower-caste widows.
Similarly, it would be instructive to examine the quite differing effects of
approaches to the restriction of so-called immoral practices, such as child marriage.
Here the Age of Consent Act 1891 and the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929
would provide fruitful perspectives on the way different approaches to apparently
progressive legislation can reap different and often unintended consequences.
The contemporary relevance of such comparisons is self-apparent. Often what
is at stake is a contest of norms: indigenous or customary or religious on the one
hand, often supranational on the other, framed now not so much in the quaint
guise of nineteenth-century child-saving movements, but in the language of human
rights. Colonial legal scholars have in some senses been in furious disagreement
over how to interpret colonial prohibitions on what were viewed as immoral or bar-
barous practices. Were these something like the first contours of a universal human
rights paradigm? Or did they do little more than place a façade of universalism over
a fundamentally coercive and authoritarian system (see Martinez 2012; Pitts 2012)?
First in India and then, by way of export, in other sites of British colonial rule
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(Tupper 1907; Allott 1957), experience was recorded of how traditional justice and
customary law mechanisms could be fused with formal, state-centered law and
thence to overarching norms believed non-derogable on the basis of custom or cul-
ture alone.
One British approach had its origins in Roman law and first appeared in the
East India Company’s civil law on Bombay Island in the mid-seventeenth century
(Derrett 1963). The phrase used was “justice, equity and good conscience,” and by
the nineteenth century, it had become a device for two linked purposes, both rele-
vant to contemporary rule-of-law programming. In the first case, it was used as a
device for importing norms or legal rules in circumstances where statute, custom, or
religion were all silent. The second was broadly speaking akin to the modern idea
of a human rights norm and in this use took the form of a repugnancy test. The
Punjab Laws Act 1872 provides a good example of this form. On the civil side, for
example, the Act provided that:
s.5 In questions regarding succession, special property of females,
betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, adoption, guardianship, minority, bas-
tardy, family relations, wills, legacies, gifts, partitions, or any religious
usage or institution the rule of decision shall be—
(a) any custom applicable to the parties concerned, which is not contrary
to justice, equity or good conscience . . .
In that last phrase lay an elastic capacity to intervene where higher-level or what
were perceived as more progressive norms were at stake, such as the rights of
women or children.
Similar formulations were made across the British Empire and there is now an
extensive body of case law and a smaller secondary literature on its operation, both
historical (Caplan 1964) and contemporary (Akamba and Tufuor 2011; for an early
revisionist critique, see Moore 1992). Yet here again, despite what might appear to
be an instance of lawfare, doing violence to traditional norms, courts frequently
were sensitive to the purposes of custom and the nature of social evolution and its
attending forces of social control.
In Eleko v Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662, for example, a case that
reached the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the court determined that
even if a barbarous custom that would otherwise be rejected on the grounds of
repugnancy had been transformed under modern influences, it remained to be
shown that the amended custom retained a capacity “to regulate the relations of
the native community inter se.” This was important, for a custom could only attain
validity and so enter the plural legal landscape through such force upon those
“whose conduct it is supposed to regulate.” If the community did not accept the
modernized version of a barbarous custom, it would be invalid on that head alone.
At the same time:
the court cannot itself transform a barbarous custom into a milder one. If
it still stands in its barbarous character it must be rejected as repugnant to
“natural justice, equity and good conscience”.
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Thus we see in these circumstances an acceptance that while repugnancy might
seem a blunt instrument exercising an external norm, custom was viewed as wholly
the province of those who would be ruled by it: it was not for the court to socially
engineer a more universally acceptable version of it. As to the question of whether
repugnancy clauses constituted early thinking about universal human rights norms,
this is something that must be left for another day. It is sufficient here simply to
note that colonial and postcolonial jurisdictions provide a rich source for under-
standing mechanisms that might import external norms as well as experience on
how these processes have created social tensions or relieved social ills: better under-
standing of all this would assist contemporary rule-of-law promotion.
Finally, we must, of course, attend to the sociolegal question of how deeply
this colonial rule of law penetrated: Was it simply the preserve of “native” elites, or
were these transformations more deeply felt, so that common people engaged with
law in some new way? The answer to that question will obviously vary from place
to place. However, if we are to remain with our Punjab case, it is possible to make
a number of observations that, together, suggest that a vision of law, recognizable as
constitutive of colonial rule of law, did indeed become “deeply imbricated”
(Thompson 1975, 261) within Punjab society. That rather hedged description of
what rule of law might have been in the Punjab is intended to be so, for the British
fashioned a complex armature of law and legal forums suitable, it was hoped, to all
levels of legal grievance and relationship to customary or formal claim.
At its head was the Punjab Chief Court, which was by no means a simple
extension of government authority. Shortly after establishment in 1866, for exam-
ple, it gave notice of its independence by striking down as unlawful the administra-
tive detention of so-called criminal tribes on the basis of the sanctity of “natives’”
liberty rights against arbitrary intrusion (Brown 2014). Beneath the Chief Court
was a system of six classes of formal courts in which civil and criminal claims and
disputes were heard, and in which the putative problem of excessive litigation con-
tinually vexed administrators and tested the capacity of court lists. As the Imperial
Gazetteer of India put it: “Relative to the population, the Punjab may be called the
most litigious Province in India” (Government of India 1908, 337).
Part of the volume of litigation was attributable to a high-resolution setting of
lex loci, the appropriate custom upon which an appellant might call, which often
went deeper than tribal affiliation to recognize intratribal variation in traditional
norms. Lifting some of this burden on courts was achieved by the Punjab Panchayat
Act 1912. The Act provided for the (re)establishment of these allegedly traditional
village-level bodies and reflected a British penchant for reinventing old practices to
serve modern purposes. At the same time, however, recognition of the potentially
troublesome implications of custom, particularly as it affected the transfer of land
and assets, resulted in forms of legislative intervention. The Punjab Pre-Emption
Act 1905, for example, specifically excluded custom from preemption suits involv-
ing agricultural land or village immovable property.
Clearly, this legal architecture was not whole-born. It was pieced together over
decades of experiment, advance, and retreat, as various ideas were tested and found
either satisfactory or wanting. Investigations of custom, for example, illustrated not
only great diversity, but also a sense that there might be in the Punjab what could
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be termed a core of customary law common to almost all tribes and classes. Henry
Baden-Powell, a Chief Court Judge in the Punjab, wrote of Punjab tribal law that
“[t]hough customs may vary considerably . . . there is nevertheless a thread of princi-
ple running through the whole subject of custom to land” (1896, 55). If that was
so, could such threads be codified and so relieve courts and tribunals of some of the
enormous pressure created by claims to custom, often as specific as family custom,
or kulachar? Codification was indeed intensely debated, culminating in the Punjab
Codification of Customary Law Conference (Government of Punjab 1915; Prenter
1924). In contemporary South Sudan there is a drive to find just such a customary
core and thence to codify it. Understanding better the Punjab’s web of intersecting
formal and customary laws, modern and traditional legal forums, and systems of reg-
istration, recording, and review would undoubtedly advance contemporary planning
and problem identification in South Sudan and other sites of rule-of-law
programming.
CONCLUSION
What should be done with the stalled project of developing the rule of law in
developing, fragile, and conflict-affected states? This article has sought at least some
part of an answer to that question on the fortieth anniversary of E. P. Thompson’s
Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act. It has done so by reviewing
Thompson’s influential account of the development of the rule of law in England
and by connecting it with a much less noticed literature that considers his work in
light of the imperial experience of introducing formal, state-centered law into for-
eign, often tradition-bound, societies, before looking more deeply into the benefits
of studying those colonial histories. In doing so it has answered a call for more
reflexive and historically nuanced understandings of the relationship between law
and societies at various stages of development.
This examination of law bringing and state making has shown that the abstrac-
tion inherent in historical study is a particularly powerful tool for identifying ideas
and processes of key importance. The enduring legacy of Thompson’s Whigs and
Hunters thus lies not in his depiction of the Black Act’s barbarity, but in his identi-
fication of two key virtues of an English-style rule-of-law model. The first is that its
procedural emphasis and ideal of justice, however rough and ready in practice, pro-
vided the magnet that drew plebeian classes toward formal law. The second, that in
doing so, this law at once shored up an emerging centralized state and captured the
holders of power within a framework that ultimately tamed their capacity to exer-
cise their power arbitrarily. It was these broad achievements that for Thompson
characterized the rule of law and that he famously described as “an unqualified
human good” (1975, 266). Looking across a wide array of colonial contexts, writers
engaging with Thompson’s lessons have found much the same effects for state-led
law. Against contemporary conclusions that all is relative and no common princi-
ples transcend the particularities of different societies, Thompson’s conclusions and
those of colonial legal scholars suggest quite the opposite: there are readily identifi-
able building blocks of law and state forms.
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The question before us now is whether we can reasonably look to this colonial
experience for lessons, given the acknowledged history of colonial oppressions.
Such oppressions are well documented and must be acknowledged. To say that
imperial dominion of one people over another is a bad thing is a truism, but to rec-
ognize that colonialism itself was not a universal good does not at all mean that
there is nothing to be learned from it, that it left behind nothing of value institu-
tionally, or that there are no lessons to be learned from its legal experiments, suc-
cessful and unsuccessful. A key argument of this article has been that colonial
experience provides a rich and often meticulously documented archive of experi-
ence in rule-of-law development, should we care to look.
The most salient conclusion of this article, however, is that these colonial con-
texts, when examined, in fact share an enormous amount in common with contem-
porary governance and rule-of-law promotion contexts: the developing, fragile, and
postconflict states of the Global South. Thus, contemporary rule-of-law program-
ming, which dates its history back not much more than thirty or forty years, sud-
denly gains a deep history. Exploration of that history and mining of lessons from
its deep historical records would require an engagement between historians, legal
scholars, and development practitioners, something of a novel task. Nevertheless, it
may be hoped that this article has provided at least a prima facie case for testing
such an integrative, multidisciplinary approach. Doing so would answer Woolcock,
Szreter, and Rao’s (2011) demand for a more historically sophisticated and concep-
tually nuanced account of law’s development in foreign parts. It might also go some
way to heeding Martin Krygier’s (2017, 133) warning that “rule of law promotion is
too important to be left to lawyers” alone.
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